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Justice Rehnquist’s Theory of Indian Law:
The Evolution from Mazurie to Atkinson – Where Did He Leave the Court?
Brenna Willott1
“I am convinced that a well-defined body of principles is essential in order to
end the need for case-by-case litigation which has plagued this area of the law
for a number of years.”2
- Justice William Rehnquist, 1980
I. Introduction
Almost immediately upon taking his seat on the United States Supreme Court in
1972, Justice Rehnquist demonstrated an interest in Indian law, writing the opinion for
the Court in the 1975 decision, United States v. Mazurie.3 In the following twenty-seven
years on the Court, both as an associate justice and as chief justice, Rehnquist
continued to demonstrate an interest in refining the Indian law jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court. Rehnquist’s opinions in his first eight years on the Court included eight
majority opinions and four dissents in the field of Indian law.4 His impact on Indian law
goes beyond what even his long tenure on the Court would suggest.5 Through
consistency of ideology, sheer number of opinions authored, and eventually through
seniority on the Court, Rehnquist built a body of law that introduced new limits on tribal
sovereignty, and that stands as precedent for any future cases the Court takes in this
area.
This paper will trace the evolution of Rehnquist’s theory of Indian law and his use
of precedent and history through a chronological analysis of the key majority decisions
that he wrote, and also through two key opinions in which he participated but did not
write for the majority. These opinions reflect Rehnquist’s evolution from a theory of
Indian law relatively affirming of tribal sovereignty, including the right of tribes to
regulate the activities of non-Indians on tribal lands, to a theory of implied divestiture of
tribal authority which gave regulatory power increasingly to the states. In his time on
the Court, Rehnquist largely rewrote the foundational cases in Indian law, authored by
Chief Justice John Marshall in the early 19th century.
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The foundational cases, known as the Marshall trilogy, include Johnson v.
McIntosh (1823),6 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831),7 and Worcester v. Georgia
(1832).8 In Johnson, Marshall articulated the doctrine of discovery, where according to
Marshall Indians had a right of occupancy on the land, however by discovery the
Europeans gained “absolute ultimate title.”9 Marshall followed the Johnson opinion by
writing Cherokee, where he found that the tribes are “domestic dependent nations.”10
In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall made his most emphatic endorsement of tribal
sovereignty. He used strong statements to carry his point, writing that “the several
Indian nations [are] distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within
which their authority is exclusive,”11 and that within those boundaries “the laws of
Georgia can have no force.”12 Professor David Getches has summarized Marshall’s
“ringing, unmistakable” endorsement of tribal sovereignty by capturing the essential
language Marshall used in Worcester, including references to “national character,” “right
of self-government,” “nations capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war,”
“distinct, independent political communities,” “Indian nations,” “political existence,” and
“pre-existing power of the nation to govern itself.”13
Rehnquist took this precedent in a very different direction from Marshall,
reflecting his focus on limiting the inherent sovereignty of tribes to internal matters.
According to Rehnquist, the authority of a tribe could properly be exercised only over
tribal members. Once a non-member entered the picture, Rehnquist shifted his stance
to one of implied divestiture of tribal authority, meaning that a tribe could exert limited or
no authority over non-Indian persons unless and until the federal government delegated
that authority to the tribe. Otherwise, the exercise of tribal authority over non-Indians is
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes.14 This shift also allowed Rehnquist
leeway to assert his states’ rights perspective.
In addition to tracing Rehnquist’s theory of Indian law, this paper will also follow
his use of history and precedent in applying his theory of implied divestiture. While
early decisions authored by Rehnquist relied on prior case precedent, in later years he
increasingly employed history and custom to make his point. Towards the end of his
time on the Court, Rehnquist returned again to precedent, some of it in case law written
by his own hand. Throughout, he relied on fact-specific analysis in order to reach his
conclusions. Part II begins with consideration of Rehnquist’s early years on the Court.
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II. 1972 – 1980: Early Years on the Court
Justice Rehnquist’s most dramatic transformation in the area of Indian law took
place in the 1970s. As a relative newcomer to the Supreme Court, Rehnquist applied
different techniques to reach decisions in Indian law cases, and his written opinions
reflect this experimentation. His first opinion as an associate justice, United States v.
Mazurie,15 was relatively supportive of tribal sovereignty, while his last authored opinion
in this period, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,16 marks one of the most profound
limitations on tribal sovereignty in the history of the Court.
A. Mazurie and Moe: The Beginning of the Implied Divestiture Theory
In the 1975 decision United States v. Mazurie, the Court addressed the question
of whether the Wind River Tribes could require that a bar owner on fee land within the
boundaries of the reservation obtain both a State of Wyoming license and a tribal
license in order to sell liquor.17 In a unanimous decision, the Court upheld the power of
Congress to delegate its regulatory authority to the Wind River Tribes.18 Rehnquist
explained that “Congress has the constitutional authority to control the sale of alcoholic
beverages by non-Indians on fee-patented land within the boundaries of an Indian
reservation, and . . . Congress could validly make a delegation of this authority to a
reservation’s tribal council.”19
This holding is relatively unique in Rehnquist opinions, as it was supportive of
tribal authority despite attempts by the Mazuries to establish that the “State of Wyoming
had jurisdiction over non-Indians and their lands within the reservation.”20 In support of
his reasoning Rehnquist revisited early Indian law cases, including cases in support of
the proposition that “Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of
sovereignty over both their members and their territory,”21 and that tribes are a
“‘separate people,’ possessing ‘the power of regulating their internal and social
relations.’”22
In reaching this conclusion, Rehnquist relied heavily on fact-specific analysis of
the location of the bar within the reservation of the Wind River Tribes. Indeed, the case
largely turned on whether the bar’s location could be considered “Indian Country,” and
among other factors, the Court considered the proportion of Indian families in the area,
the number of Indian students in the state school nearby, and even the testimony of the
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bar owner, indicating that the bar served both Indian and non-Indian patrons: “We are
kind of out there by ourselves, you know.”23
Justice Rehnquist’s next majority opinion, Moe v. Confederated Salish and
Kotenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation,24 followed quickly after Mazurie in 1976 and is
Rehnquist’s first articulation of his theory of implied divestiture. Like Mazurie, Moe was
a unanimous decision by the Court. This was the first opinion by Rehnquist relating to
taxation, answering specifically the question of whether reservation sales of cigarettes
to Indians were subject to taxation by the State of Montana. Relying on McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Commission,25 the Court upheld the District Court finding that sales
to Indians were not subject to the state tax, but that the tax must be imposed on sales to
non-Indians.26
In the opinion, Rehnquist differentiated between what he saw as the inherent
power of the tribe to govern its internal affairs,27 and the power of the state to tax the
activities of non-members within its boundaries, even if those activities occur on a
reservation. He began by citing to McClanahan for the proposition that “[i]n the special
area of state taxation . . . there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian
reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the
reservation.”28 However, the state’s sales tax may be imposed on non-Indian
purchases because it is a “minimal burden designed to avoid the likelihood [that] nonIndians purchasing from the tribal seller will avoid payment of a concededly lawful tax.”29
The Moe opinion is thus a significant departure from Chief Justice Marshall’s
view of tribal sovereignty as found in Worcester v. Georgia. In Worcester, Marshall
wrote that the laws of the state have no force within the reservation;30 in Moe, Rehnquist
found that since the burden on the tribe in collecting the tax from non-Indians was
minimal, the state law could apply on the reservation.31 He commented: “We see
nothing in this burden which frustrates tribal self-government.”32
Mazurie and Moe thus represent initial attempts by Rehnquist at defining a
doctrine of Indian law. Most notably his theory of implied divestiture is first articulated in
Moe, where he found that a state could reach across the borders of the reservation to
collect tax from sales to non-Indians without infringing on the right of the tribe to govern
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the reservation. In both cases, he relied on prior Supreme Court precedent for his
authority, an approach that would begin to shift in his next two decisions.

B. Rosebud and Oliphant: History and Culture Replace Precedent
While Rehnquist is perhaps best known for his use of history as a basis for the
Court’s holding in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,33 his first attempt at this
approach may be found in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip.34 Written in 1977, a year
before Oliphant, Rosebud addressed the question of whether the original boundaries of
the reservation had been diminished by three acts of Congress passed in 1904, 1907,
and 1910 respectively.35 The Court affirmed the original District Court holding that
these acts “did clearly evidence congressional intent to diminish the boundaries of the
Rosebud Sioux Reservation.”36
At the outset of the opinion, Justice Rehnquist set out the basis for his statutory
analysis, writing that “[a] congressional determination to terminate [an Indian
reservation] must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding
circumstances and legislative history.”37 Rehnquist began by describing the original
1889 reservation boundaries. He then shifted to the well-established principle that
“[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people
who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith,”38 before
declaring that the “mere fact that a reservation has been opened to settlement does not
necessarily mean that the opened area has lost its reservation status.”39
Moving from basic principles to a discussion of the 1904, 1907, and 1910 Acts,
Rehnquist used history and legislative intent to show that the reservation had in fact
been diminished in a lawful manner. He traced the history of the three bills through
Congress, relying on the floor discussion by the sponsor of one Act, and the historical
record showing the representations of the Secretary of the Interior, while ignoring the
constitution of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe that Secretary of the Interior had approved in
1935.40 Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissent drew on the language of the tribe’s
constitution providing that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe . . . shall extend
to the territory within the original confines of the Rosebud Reservation boundaries as
established by the act of March 2, 1889.”41 Rehnquist may have been responding to
Justice Marshall’s dissent when he replied, “[W]e cannot remake history.”42
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Rehnquist more fully developed the historical approach in the 1978 decision
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, which addressed the issue of whether Indian tribal
courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.43 In finding that tribal courts do not
have jurisdiction over non-Indians, Rehnquist’s analytical approach was very similar to
Rosebud Sioux. According to Professor Getches, what is “most remarkable, though, is
not the thin historical record on which the [Oliphant] Court relied; rather, it is the fact that
conjectures about the past were used to justify a legal principal fixing the limits of tribal
sovereignty.”44 Certainly, Rehnquist’s choice of history was selective and could be
considered misleading.
Rehnquist began his analysis by noting the fact that twelve Indian tribes besides
the Suquamish Tribe had enacted ordinances giving the tribes criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indian defendants.45 He drew, however, on the authority of the Attorney General in
1834, rather than case precedent, in asserting that “tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians, is inter alia, inconsistent with treaty provisions recognizing the sovereignty of
the United Sates over the territory assigned to the Indian nation and the dependence of
the Indians on the United States.”46
Most of the rest of the opinion is devoted to historical references, including
treaties signed by Indian tribes in Washington in the 1850s, the 1834 Western Territory
Bill, the 1891 Supreme Court decision In re Mayfield, and a 1960 Senate report.47 For
example, Rehnquist found the Court’s holding in the 1891 case In re Mayfield instructive
because “the policy of Congress had been to allow the inhabitants of the Indian country
‘such power of self government as was thought to be consistent with the safety of the
white population with which they may have come in contact, and to encourage them as
far as possible in raising themselves to our standard of civilization.’”48
Rehnquist cited to little case precedent in Oliphant. While the opinion by Chief
Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia is most often cited in support of tribal
sovereignty, in this opinion, Rehnquist instead referred twice to Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia as precedent for limitations on tribal authority. Rehnquist cited Cherokee for
the propositions (1) that tribes do retain “elements of ‘quasi-sovereign’ authority after
ceding their lands to the United States and announcing their dependence on the
Federal Government,”49 and (2) that foreign nations may not form political connections
with tribes because tribes are “completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the
United States.”50 He relied on Worcester only for the proposition that “Indian nations
were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on [the United States] . . . for their
protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country.”51 Rehnquist also
43
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cited to the first case of the Marshall trilogy, Johnson v. McIntosh, to show that tribes’
rights “to complete sovereignty, as independent nations [are] necessarily diminished.”52
Another notable citation in Oliphant is to a dissenting opinion by Justice Johnson
in the 1810 Supreme Court decision Fletcher v. Peck,53 which Rehnquist incorrectly
categorized as a concurrence with the majority.54 He referred to Fletcher for what he
termed the “intrinsic” limitations on Indian tribal authority, and which he believed were
not “restricted to limitations on the tribes’ power to transfer lands or exercise external
political sovereignty.”55 He chose the following passage from Fletcher to quote directly:
[T]he restrictions upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount . . . to an
exclusion of all competitors [to the United States] from their markets; and
the limitation upon their sovereignty amounts to the right of governing
every person within their limits except themselves.56

This citation shows that Rehnquist’s theory of implied divestiture draws in part from a
dissenting opinion in an 1810 case. Rehnquist’s belief that Indian tribes only have
authority to govern themselves, first seen in Moe, was most clearly set forth here in
Oliphant.
Oliphant has been roundly criticized because of Rehnquist’s unconventional use
of the Marshall trilogy in support of the holding.57 His use of history also makes
Oliphant remarkable in its departure from previously established principles of tribal
sovereignty. The next section considers Rehnquist’s support for Justice Thurgood
Marshall’s opinion in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez58 as a test of ideological
consistency with the Oliphant opinion.
C. Santa Clara Pueblo: Making Sense of Rehnquist’s Joining in Marshall’s
Majority
Santa Clara Pueblo, decided in 1978, limited the negative impact of Oliphant. In
addressing the question of whether a federal court may review the validity of a tribal
ordinance denying membership to the children of certain female tribal members,59 the
Court answered in the negative, strongly affirming inherent tribal authority.60 In Part II of
the opinion, Justice Marshall relied on Worcester v. Georgia in asserting that tribes are
“‘distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights’ in
52
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matters of local self government.”61 He continued: “As separate sovereigns preexisting the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by
those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state
authority.”62
Justice Rehnquist joined in all Parts of the Court’s opinion, with the exception of
Part III. Part I describes the procedural posture of the case, while Part II references
precedent generally affirming tribal sovereignty. In Part IV, Justice Marshall found that
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 did not provide a cause of action for the declaratory
and injunctive relief asserted by the respondents.63 Part V included the holding, and
also referenced Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, although Marshall seemed to believe
Cherokee was not entirely controlling:
Although we early rejected the notion that Indian tribes are ‘foreign states’
for jurisdictional purposes under Article III . . . we have also recognized
that tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations which, by government
structure, culture, and sources of sovereignty are in many ways foreign to
the constitutional institutions of the federal and state governments.64
Part III, which Rehnquist did not join, addressed in two short paragraphs the
question of whether the tribes posses “common-law immunity from suit traditionally
enjoyed by sovereign powers.”65 In Part III, Justice Marshall concluded that “[i]n the
absence here of any unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent . . . suits
against the tribe under the [Indian Civil Rights Act] are barred by its sovereign immunity
from suit.”66 Rehnquist, having introduced his theory of implied divestiture in Moe, here
remained ideologically consistent in refusing to join the section of the Santa Clara
Pueblo opinion that presumes immunity from suit until Congress indicates otherwise.67
Because Rehnquist did not write the Santa Clara Pueblo opinion, any attempt at
analysis is to some extent hypothesizing. Regardless, Santa Clara Pueblo serves as a
useful test for ideological consistency against his written opinions. Moving into the
1980s, and his concurring/dissenting opinion in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
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the Colville Indian Reservation,68 Rehnquist would make his first attempt at a bright line
rule for future Supreme Court decisions.
III. 1980s: Attempting a Bright Line Rule in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation
Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986, after which point he came increasingly
to rely on other justices to write most Indian law opinions for the majority.69 Thus, the
most representative illustration of Rehnquist’s perspective in this period comes from the
1980 decision, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
where Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part from Justice White’s majority
opinion.
Justice White, writing for the majority in Colville, found that a state may tax the
sale of cigarettes on the reservation to non-members of the tribe.70 Justice Rehnquist
wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, which continued his
historical approach from Rosebud and Oliphant and also drew heavily upon precedent
in supporting his position.71
Rehnquist began by noting that “[s]ince early in the last century, this Court has
been struggling to develop a coherent doctrine by which to measure with some
predictability the scope of Indian immunity from state taxation.”72 He made clear that he
hoped his opinion would establish a bright line rule in the state taxation area of Indian
law: “I am convinced that a well-defined body of principles is essential in order to end
the need for case-by-case litigation which has plagued this area of the law for a number
of years.” 73
Moving into the analysis, Rehnquist delved into issues of state taxing power
through precedent, in particular McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission.74 He
noted that “McClanahan established a rule against finding that ‘ambiguous statutes
abolish by implication Indian tax immunities.’”75 He next moved to Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones,76 the companion case to McClanahan.77 Mescalero was important to
Rehnquist because the Court “reviewed the tradition of sovereignty and found that no
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Nowhere is Rehnquist’s states’ rights approach more apparent than in the
beginning of Part II of his concurrence in Colville, where he noted that “[a]t issue here is
not only Indian sovereignty, but also state sovereignty as well.”79 He moved into a
discussion of Thomas v. Gay, an 1898 case which allowed state taxation of cattle
owned by non-Indians on land leased from the tribe.80 This analysis of a late 19th
century case formed part of the “‘backdrop’ which support[ed] Washington’s power to
impose the tax in issue.”81
Rehnquist’s opinion in Colville is thus consistent with both his theory that tribes
have inherent authority in governing internal affairs, but are impliedly divested of
authority in all other areas, and with his deference to states’ rights, especially when a
state is attempting to tax non-Indians with respect to goods purchased on a reservation.
One of the next cases to address this issue came a little more than a decade later, in
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma.82
IV. 1990 – 2001: Staying the Course in Citizen Band Potawatomi and Atkinson
Two decisions coming out of the 1990s and early 2000s are helpful to a
discussion of Rehnquist’s theory of Indian law: Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma (1991), and Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v.
Shirley (2001).83
In Citizen Band Potawatomi, Rehnquist wrote for the majority to invalidate a state
cigarette tax on tribal members who live in “Indian Country.” While this may at first
seem inconsistent with prior opinions, careful examination reveals Rehnquist’s
consistent application of his theory of implied divestiture. In the opinion, he relied on
Santa Clara Pueblo (Part II), “Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign
immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.”84 While the
State of Oklahoma may not impose its tax on tribal members, Rehnquist found that the
state may tax sales to non-members of the tribe.85
Ten years after Citizen Band Potawatomi, Rehnquist wrote what would become
his final opinion on Indian law, Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley. In Atkinson, the
Court found that tribes lack civil authority to tax businesses operated by non-members
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on fee land within a reservation.86 This decision implicated states’ rights, in a manner
consistent with Rehnquist’s other taxation decisions.
In so finding, Rehnquist discussed both of the exceptions from Montana v. United
States,87 before finding that neither applied in this case. Montana, decided in 1981,
reiterated the idea that the “inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend
to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”88 In Montana, the Court found two
exceptions to this rule: (1) a tribe may regulate the “activities of non members who
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” 89 and (2) a tribe may “exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”90 In considering these exceptions,
Rehnquist found that neither had the non-members at issue in the case subjected
themselves to tribal authority (exception 1), nor had they imperiled the welfare of the
tribe (exception 2).
In Atkinson, Rehnquist returned again to Justice Johnson’s dissenting opinion in
the 1810 decision Fletcher v. Peck, in support of the idea that “Indian tribes have lost
any ‘right of governing every person within their limits except themselves.’”91 As extra
support for this concept, Rehnquist returned to his first opinion written on the question of
Indian law, Mazurie, for the proposition that: “Indian tribes are ‘unique aggregations
possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,’ but
their dependent status generally precludes extension of tribal civil authority beyond
those limits.”92
Atkinson relied less on history than earlier Rehnquist opinions, perhaps because
by this point in time Rehnquist was able to cite to his own decisions as precedent.
Rehnquist may also have known this would be one of his final opportunities to write an
opinion in the area of Indian law, since the opinion appears carefully and intentionally
consistent with his earlier work in this area.
V. Conclusion
Almost immediately upon taking his seat on the Supreme Court, Justice
Rehnquist began to move the Court away from established Indian law jurisprudence
which had stood largely intact since Chief Justice Marshall wrote the trilogy of Johnson,
Cherokee, and Worcester in the early 19th century. In the area of taxation, his attempts
to generate bright line rules turned instead into fact-specific analysis that emphasized
states’ rights. In the area of jurisdiction, he found that tribes do not have criminal
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jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation, and that tribes do not have civil
jurisdiction over non-Indian activities on fee land within the reservation. His analysis of
tribal sovereignty emphasized what he viewed as the dependent status of the tribes on
the federal government. He developed analytical techniques that relied heavily on use
of historical facts chosen to prove his point. And he relied heavily on a dissenting
opinion from Fletcher v. Peck, which was written thirteen years before the first case in
the Marshall trilogy.
While Rehnquist is no longer on the Supreme Court, his body of jurisprudence
stands as precedent in any future Indian law cases the Court considers. Chief Justice
Roberts, in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co.,93 cited
Atkinson for the Montana rule, or the “general proposition that the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”94 It
is likely that any future decision of the Court regarding the extent of tribal authority
would need to address one or more opinions authored by Rehnquist, with the result that
the trend away from the recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty in the Court’s
jurisprudence may well continue for some time to come.
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